





# Towards Efficient Kyber on FPGAs: A Processor for Vector of Polynomials

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
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15. Jan. 2020

## **Public Key Cryptography**

- Different keys are used for encryption and decryption
- ■Algorithm triples {KeyGen, Encryption, Decryption}
- Standardized algorithm (Classic)
  - > RSA, see PKCS#1, ANSI X9.31, IEEE 1363




#### **An Imminent Threat**

- Quantum algorithms
  - > Shor's algorithm needs about 1 billion qubits [Shor'97]
  - > 20 million qubits break RSA in 8 hours [Gidney'19]
- Quantum computers
  - ➤ In May 2017, **USTC** developed a **10**-qubit circuit
  - > In Oct. 2017, Intel announced a 17-qubit chip
  - ➤ In Nov. 2017, **IBM** established a **50**-qubit computer
  - ➤ In Mar. 2018, **Google** announced a **72**-qubit chip
  - ▶ In Aug. 2018, Rigetti Computing plans to build and deploy a 128-qubit system

Algorithm optimization space and computing power growth should be considered

## **New Cryptography Schemes**

- Post-quantum cryptography = Quantum-resistant
  - > Kyber is a new scheme based on Module-LWE problem



# A Brief Introduction to Kyber


- **Kyber**.*KeyGen(A)*: Choose two polyvec s, e from  $\beta^k_{\eta}$  and compute t = As + eThe public key is (A, t) and the private key is s.
- **Kyber.** Enc(A, t, m): The message m is first encoded to  $\overline{m}$ . Sample polyvec r,  $e_1$  from  $\beta^k_{\eta}$  and  $e_2$  from  $\beta_{\eta}$ . The ciphertext then consists of polyvec  $u = A^T r + e_1$  and polynomial  $v = t^T r + e_2 + \overline{m}$ .
- Kyber.Dec(s, u, v): Compute m' = v-s<sup>T</sup>u and recover the original message m from m' using a decoder.
- Computing over vector of polynomials (polyvec)
  - > 13-bit coefficients, modulo 7681

  - > k-dimensional vector, depends on security level (2,3,4)
- ■Example, As + e is computational intensive

## Multiplication over polyvec

■Example: for Kyber512, k=2

$$\mathbf{A}\mathbf{s} = \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{A}(0,0)\,\mathbf{s}(0) + \mathbf{A}(0,1)\,\mathbf{s}(1) \\ \mathbf{A}(1,0)\,\mathbf{s}(0) + \mathbf{A}(1,1)\,\mathbf{s}(1) \end{bmatrix}$$



- ■Number-Theoretic Transformation (NTT) [Po.'12]
  - Execute NTT transformation for k polynomials respectively in a polyvec.

#### **Overview**

# Optimizing the Control Logic

Merge operations to avoid idle cycles

# Optimizing Memory Access Scheme


- > Dual-column sequential storage structure
- in-place computation without bit-reversal

# Optimizing Arithmetic Logic Unit

- > Gentlemen-Sande (GS) butterfly
- > Integrate NTT, multiply-accumulate and multiply-add
- > Pipelined implementation


# **Optimizing Arithmetic Operations**

- By adjusting control logic
  - > Save 29.4% cycles for Kyber512 (k=2)
  - > Save 33.3% cycles for Kyber1024 (k=4)




## **Optimizing Memory Access Scheme**

- Break the bottleneck
  - > Read 2 coefficients and writeback 2 coefficients
  - > Block RAM slice can be configured as
    - 2 read ports
    - 2 write ports
    - 1 read and 1 write ports
- Dual-column sequential scheme
  - > Increase memory width
  - Example, Kyber512 (k=2)




## **Optimizing Memory Access Scheme**

- ■In-place NTT transformation
  - Transform 2 polynomials with time-multiplexed ALU
  - Swap data before and after execution




# **Optimizing Arithmetic Logic Unit**

- ■Make full use of the DSP slice
  - > Cooley-Tukey vs. Gentlemen-Sande butterfly



# **Optimizing Arithmetic Logic Unit**


- Integrate functions in one processor
  - > Forward NTT and inverse NTT transformation
  - > Multiply-accumulate over polyvec, like a₀∘s₀+a₁∘s₁
  - $\triangleright$  Multiply-add over polyvec, like  $\mathbf{a_0} \circ \mathbf{s_0} + \mathbf{e_0}$



Design a pipelined structure

Introduction

- Maximize the usage of DSP/BRAM internal registers
- > Trade-off between area and performance



# Implementation on FPGAs

- Experimental Setup
  - > Implemented in Verilog HDL available at:
    - https://github.com/cccisi/Kyber\_ASPDAC
    - Built on XILINX Vivado® 2018.2 design suite for Artix-7
    - Also built on XILINX ISE<sup>®</sup> 14.7 design suite for Spartan-6

**Implementations** 

Post-place and route

#### Results

- Maximum frequency
  - 130MHz for Kyber1024
  - 31684 NTT operations per second
- > Area
  - The processor occupies 477 LUTs and 237 FFs

# Implementation on FPGAs

Comparisons on NTT efficiency

Processor	Area			Operations/s		Efficiency
	LUTs	FFs	DSPs	Operations/s		Efficiency
This Work	477	237	1	NTT:	31684	66.4
				MUL:	9050	19.0
Oder, Güneysu'17	415	251	2	NTT:	3487	9.3
				MUL:	1545	3.7
Kuo, Yang'17	2832	1381	8	NTT:	59337	21.9
				MUL:	NA	NA

**Implementations** 


- ➤ Compared with [Oder, Güneysu'17]
  - Integrated more functions
  - Over 5x advantages in performance
- ➤ Compared with [Kuo, Yang'17]
  - Over 55.2% performance with about 17.2% logical units

#### Conclusion

- We achieved high-efficiency post-quantum algorithm on resource-constrained hardware
- > Broke memory bottleneck for higher performance
- Made full use of FPGA internal resources
- ➤ Implemented the key modules for Kyber512/1024, but **NOT** the entire Kyber cryptosystem

#### **■**Future works

- Countermeasures against possible attacks, sidechannel attack ...
- Which post-quantum algorithms are the outstanding ones in practical applications?



#### **Thank You For Your Attention!**



### Reference

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